Government formation in multiparty systems is of self-evident substantive importance, and the subject of an enormous theoretical literature. Empirical evaluations of models of government formation tend to separate government formation per se, from the distribution of key government payoffs such as cabinet portfolios between members of the government that forms. Models of government formation are necessarily specified ex ante, absent any knowledge of the government that forms. Models of the distribution of cabinet portfolios are typically, though not necessarily, specified ex post, given knowledge of the identity of some government "formateur" or even of the full partisan composition of the eventual cabinet. This disjunction lies at the heart of a notorious contradiction between predictions of the distribution of cabinet portfolios made by canonical models of legislative bargaining, and the robust empirical regularity of proportional portfolio allocations -"Gamson's Law". We resolve this contradiction by specifying and estimating a joint model of cabinet formation and portfolio distribution, which for example predicts ex ante which parties will receive zero portfolios rather than taking this as given ex post.
government formation are necessarily specified ex ante, absent any knowledge of the government that forms. Models of the distribution of cabinet portfolios are typically, though not necessarily, specified ex post, given knowledge of the identity of some government "formateur" or even of the full partisan composition of the eventual cabinet. This disjunction lies at the heart of a notorious contradiction between predictions of the distribution of cabinet portfolios made by canonical models of legislative bargaining, and the robust empirical regularity of proportional portfolio allocations -"Gamson's Law". We resolve this contradiction by specifying and estimating a joint model of cabinet formation and portfolio distribution, which for example predicts ex ante which parties will receive zero portfolios rather than taking this as given ex post.
We conclude that canonical models of legislative bargaining do add to our ability to predict government membership, but that portfolio distribution between government members conforms robustly to a proportionality norm … we suggest because portfolio distribution follows the much more difficult process of policy bargaining in the typical government formation process.
INTRODUCTION
Government formation in multiparty systems is of self-evident substantive importance. There is a large and heterodox theoretical literature dealing with this. Of special interest to political scientists, key "outputs" of the government formation process, for example partisan composition of the cabinet and distribution of portfolios between cabinet members, as well as bargaining delays and cabinet durations, are easily and unambiguously observable. This enables a more clear-cut confrontation between theory and data than is typically the case in political science. It has also thrown into sharp relief a puzzle that Warwick and Druckman call the "portfolio allocation paradox", a notorious contradiction between predictions of the distribution of cabinet portfolios made by canonical alternating offers models of legislative bargaining, and the robust empirical regularity of proportional portfolio allocations that has been characterized as " Gamson's Law". 1 Empirical models of government formation are necessarily specified ex ante, absent any knowledge of the government that forms.
2 Empirical models of the distribution of cabinet portfolios are typically specified ex post, given knowledge of the identity of some putative government "formateur" or the full partisan composition of the cabinet. 3 We argue below that this disjunction lies at the heart of the portfolio allocation "paradox", and set out to resolve the paradox by specifying and estimating a joint ex ante model of cabinet formation and portfolio
distribution. An important feature of such a joint model is that it treats the list of parties outside the cabinet as informative, predicting ex ante which parties will receive zero portfolios rather 1 (Warwick and Druckman 2006) 2 See for example (Martin and Stevenson 2010; Martin and Stevenson 2001) 3 See for example Snyder et al. 2005; Druckman 2001, 2006; Falcó-Gimeno and Indridason 2013) Cabinet formation and portfolio distribution in European multi-party systems / 3 than taking this as given. Our joint model allows us to conclude that canonical models of legislative bargaining do add to our ability to predict government membership, but that portfolio distribution between government members conforms robustly to a proportionality norm, giving support to recent ex ante theoretical models of portfolio distribution.
RESOLVING THE PORTFOLIO ALLOCATION PARADOX

The paradox
The essential features of the portfolio allocation paradox have been extensively discussed by
Warwick and Druckman among many others, 4 and we confine ourselves here to its bare bones. A long tradition of empirical research linking legislative seat shares to distributions of cabinet positions originates in work published over 50 years ago by the sociologist William Gamson. 5 This established a strong and non-trivial empirical regularity, "Gamson's Law" (GL).
Government parties tend to receive cabinet portfolios in strict proportion to the legislative seats they contribute to the government's aggregate seat total. Gamson did not provide a formal bargaining model that yielded GL as a prediction. Indeed, if party leaders are motivated to maximize "Gamsonian" (proportional-to-seats) payoffs, the government coalition should command the smallest legislative seat total that is also a legislative majority. This is not true empirically, a finding first published over 40 years ago. 6 Nonetheless, GL itself has proved extraordinarily robust to replication, even when different cabinet portfolios are assigned very 4 (Bassi 2013; Carroll and Cox 2007a; Laver et al. 2011; Warwick and Druckman 2006; Falcó-Gimeno and Indridason 2013) 5 Browne and Franklin 1973; Browne and Frendreis 1980; Fréchette et al. 2005b; Gamson 1961; Laver et al. 2011; Schofield and Laver 1985; Warwick and Druckman 2006; Snyder et al. 2005) different empirical weights. 7 On the other side of the paradox we find canonical alternating offers models of legislative bargaining, with an intellectual pedigree traceable to Rubinstein (1982) , adapted to legislative bargaining by Baron and Ferejohn (1989 (2) "One key prediction of the model … is that the party that is recognized to form a coalition -the formateur -will receive a share of the cabinet posts that is much larger than its share of the voting weight."
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On the face of things these two propositions seem contradictory: "payoffs are proportional to voting weights" but "the formateur gets a payoff much larger than its share of voting weight".
The apparent contradiction arises, because the first proposition is stated ex ante, absent knowledge of the identity of the formateur. The second proposition is stated ex post, knowing the identity of the formateur. The propositions are therefore not contradictory because they apply in 7 Browne and Franklin 1973; Browne and Frendreis 1980; Fréchette et al. 2005b; Gamson 1961; Laver et al. 2011; Schofield and Laver 1985; Warwick and Druckman 2006; Snyder et al. 2005) 8 Snyder et al. 2005) 9 (Snyder et al 2005: 982) 10 (Snyder et al 2005: 992) (Laver et al. 2011) 14 (Golder 2010 ) (p8) 15 Snyder et al., 2005; Warwick and Druckman 2006 16 Laver et al., 2011 17 (Carroll and Cox 2007a) p 301.
18 (Bassi 2013) p778 Resolving the paradox Two theoretical questions underlie this paradox, as we have seen. The first is the claim that there is some formateur in a privileged bargaining position. The second is the claim that parties' portfolio payoffs respond to their theoretical voting weights (MIWs) rather than their raw seat shares. We argue above against predicting portfolio payoffs ex post, after Nature has told us the identity of the randomly chosen formateur but before the government has formed, given the problem of identifying the list of exogenously selected formateurs in a way that is not endogenous to the bargaining outcome, compounded by the lack of any measurable effect once this problem is addressed. We therefore address the paradox by predicting portfolio allocation ex ante, absent any knowledge of the formateur, and developing a joint ex ante model of government formation and portfolio distribution.
This leads us to the second question, of whether raw seat shares or theoretical voting weights better predict parties' observed portfolio shares. Absent knowledge of the formateur, the canonical bargaining models referred to above predict that:
 payoffs will be proportional to theoretical voting weights;
 only minimal winning coalitions will form; (minority cabinets face a majority opposition with both the incentive and ability to capture all portfolios; surplus coalitions contain members who are not needed yet consume some portfolios);
 parties with zero MIW will therefore not be part of any government coalition.
Unlike the canonical bargaining models, the GL prediction that portfolio distribution will reflect raw seats shares lacks deep theoretical underpinnings, though several scholars have recently addressed this. Anna Bassi assumes that formateurs are not picked exogenously, but emerge endogenously from negotiations between party leaders. Her model predicts no formateur Cabinet formation and portfolio distribution in European multi-party systems / 8
advantage (in equilibrium, party leaders bargain this away), and Gamsonian payoffs. 19 The latter arise because Bassi (p784) assumes any proposed payoff distribution must satisfy the full set of party legislators, not just a single party leader. Carroll and Cox model bargaining over government formation that begins before an election, not after this. Their argument is that committing to Gamsonian payoffs in pre-election deals provides incentives for all parties to the deal to expend maximum electoral effort on increasing their legislative seat total, increasing the probability that both they and their coalition partners will take office. Falco-Gimenó and
Indridason argue that Gamsonian portfolio distributions act as natural "focal points" in a difficult and complex bargaining environment, involving complicated policy negotiations and many other matters besides, thereby taking one piece of complexity off the bargaining table.
20
Given theoretical arguments on both sides of the debate, it is helpful to resolve empirically the question of whether parties' portfolio payoffs tend to respond to raw seat shares or their theoretical voting weights. Building on the argument of Falco-Gimenó and Indridason, it is also helpful to investigate whether Gamsonsian proportional payoffs become more likely as the bargaining environment becomes more complex. We address both of these questions below.
A joint a priori model of government formation and portfolio distribution
Until now, all empirical work on portfolio payoffs has predicted these given a particular coalition of parties that has already formed. 21 In other words, existing empirical work has modeled portfolio distribution ex post, conditional on government formation and regardless of whether the government that formed was predicted by any model. From a theoretical perspective, 19 Bassi 2013 20 (Falcó-Gimeno and Indridason 2013) 21 Snyder et al. 2005; Warwick and Druckman 2006; Laver et al. 2011; Carroll and Cox 2007b; Falcó-Gimeno and Indridason 2013) Cabinet formation and portfolio distribution in European multi-party systems / 9
this is despite the fact that bargaining models predict portfolio distribution as an integral part of a model of government formation, so that (in)ability to predict government membership is highly relevant empirically. In practical terms, ex post modeling of payoff distributions results in deletion from the analysis of every party receiving no cabinet portfolio. This happens even when the theoretical model under investigation predicts that, on average, many of these parties should receive a positive bargaining payoff and should with some positive probability be members of the government. Selecting on the dependent variable in this way ignores the possibility that there may be complexities in the bargaining process that systematically select different types of party, contrary to the claim that parties should receive portfolio payoff solely in proportion to their bargaining strength.
We therefore eschew ex post prediction of portfolio distributions and specify an ex ante statistical approach that includes all parties involved in government formation, whether or not they join the cabinet and receive a payoff, and evaluates joint predictions of government membership and payoff allocation between government members. This is analogous to an approach developed recently by Chiba, et al. which develops a statistical model to evaluate joint predictions of government formation and government duration.
STATISTICAL MODEL
Our unit of analysis is a political party in a government formation situation. Our dependent variable is the party's observed share of cabinet portfolios. This ranges in theory from 0 to 1, and has a point mass at zero in empirical data. A party with zero cabinet portfolios is by all conventional definitions considered not to be a member of the government; a party with non-zero portfolios is considered to be a government member; a party with all the portfolios constitutes a 22 (Chiba et al. 2014) single party cabinet. Thus, our dependent variable is far from normally distributed. While we present results of OLS regressions in supplementary materials, to facilitate comparison with previously published work, our core method involves maximum likelihood models based on a mixed continuous-discrete distribution. The dependent variable is a proportion and therefore has a limited range. This suggests the choice of a beta distribution, which is flexible enough to suit the problem (see Brehm and Gates on this topic). 23 As a continuous function, however, it is not appropriate for modeling large numbers of values that are at a single point, and the dependent variable has a very large number of zeros, which arise whenever a given party is not included in the government. This implies using a mixed distribution. We adopt this approach, following work by Ospina and Ferrari, 24 and model these data as a mixture between a beta distribution and a degenerate distribution in 0. By using a zero-inflated beta model such as this, we directly model both the likelihood a party enters a coalition or not, and then, upon entry, its payoff in cabinet seats. Hence, the likelihood function we maximize is:
(1− ) −1 : ∈(0,1) , … where:
= log (
), = log (
Link functions were chosen to constrain parameters to the unit interval (in the case of ν i and µ i ) and to be strictly positive in the case of the precision parameter σ i . The parameter ν i has a direct 23 Brehm and Gates, 1993. 24 Ospina and Ferrari, 2012 . We could employ a more complicated model that includes one's (i.e., governments where a single party forms the governments, despite the fact that this party does not have a majority of seats in the parliament), but there are very few observations where this occurs.
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and relevant substantive interpretation: it gives the likelihood of a zero observation, hence the inverse likelihood of cabinet membership. The parameter µ i is the mean for the beta distribution and shows the strength of the relationship between the independent variables and the party portfolio shares; σ i is the precision of the beta distribution. We thereby achieve our core objective of deriving distinct joint estimates of the probability of cabinet membership, v i , and the distribution of cabinet portfolios, µ i .
Weighting cases
Since our unit of analysis is a political party in a government formation situation, we might ask whether all observations in the data should, as in all previous empirical analyses, have equal weight. Different countries have different numbers of parties and some have many more governments than others. Italy, for example, had more governments than most other European countries in the post-war era and also tends to have more parties than most other countries. The dataset we describe below covers 16 countries, but Italy accounts for about 22% of the observations. Italy, Belgium, Denmark, and Finland together account for about 55% of all observations. Empirical analyses that ignore this may be biased, and we don't want our "crossnational" analysis of portfolio distribution to be mostly about Italy, Belgium, Denmark, and
Finland. In order to control for the different weights of parties in the estimation due to the differences in party system sizes and frequency of elections, we calculated a probability for each party to be selected into a subsample of our data. This selection probability is inversely related to the number of parties in parliament. It is calculated as:
the truncated data set. Based on the selection probabilities, 80% of observations (1134 parties) in the truncated data set are randomly selected in a subsample. 25 By providing results based on multiple, randomly drawn samples, we mitigate the possibility that one nation exercises undue influence on the results. 26 In many respects, our sampling strategy functions like the bootstrap.
By creating empirical distributions from the data and generating multiple samples (with replacement), we hedge against any single nation (or subset of cabinets) having undue influence on our results.
27
Estimation approach
As indicated in the previous section, our estimation method involves creating multiple training sets based on the principle of the empirical bootstrap. We use these training sets to test three different models. The first includes all cabinets and is the main test of whether theoretical voting weights or raw seat shares best predict outcomes, including both government membership and 25 We use a threshold of 80% for the training set (and accordingly, 20% for the test set) to insure that the test samples are large enough to make reasonable inferences. Splitting the sample in this way is accepted practice in the machine learning literature, though there are more complex ways to accomplish the same goals (see, for example, Bishop and Nasrabadi, 2006).
26 To provide comparability with previously published results that do not weight cases in this way, we provide unweighted ("flat pi"), boostrapped OLS versions of all key estimates in the online supplementary materials (Appendix 3, Tables A3.1 and A3.2).
27 We also tried a more aggressive strategy that rebalanced the relative proportions of the various nations in the training sets to make them more even. This modified approach did not produce substantively different results but is available on request.
Cabinet formation and portfolio distribution in European multi-party systems / 13 payoff distribution. Addressing Falco-Gimenó and Indridason's argument that Gamsonian payoffs are a response by party leaders to bargaining complexity, we test two further models using these training data, separating bargaining settings according to their complexity. We divided "simple" from "complex" settings according to the difficulty of calculating the full set of 2 n -1 coalitions in an n-party system, and therefore of exploring all coalition possibilities, using a natural inflection point in the time taken by our computational algorithm to calculate MIWs. 28 A pivotal party P is one with non-zero MIW. For robustness, we examined models setting the "complexity" threshold at 7 or 9 pivotal parties and the results were similar. 29 Given the vanishingly small probability that all members of any cabinet would be selected in all samples, this sampling strategy also addresses the methodological issue that the set of party portfolio proportions within any given cabinet generate compositional data. (Freixas and Kurz 2011; Molinero 2009a, 2009b; Montero 2002 Montero , 2006 34 (Montero 2006) 35 (Strauss 2003) 36 Snyder et al. 2005) between "simple" MIWs, and "MIWs preserving types". 39 We programmed and verified our own algorithm and, assuming a simple majority winning quota, calculated MIWs preserving types from party seat totals reported in Parlgov.
Single party majorities and minority governments
When a single political party wins a legislative majority, models of government formation invariably converge on the prediction that it will form a single party government and award itself all cabinet portfolios. This is almost invariably true empirically and is not an open theoretical question. While we might think of plausible models that treat single party majority governments as coalitions of party factions, this is neither the focus of the literature with which we are dealing 37 (Freixas and Kurz 2011) . Freixas and Kurz note this problem is especially acute with "non- nor our focus in this paper. We therefore exclude from our analysis, as uninformative for our purposes, settings in which a single party won a legislative majority.
Minority cabinets pose a more difficult challenge for a joint model of government formation and portfolio distribution. Predicting the formation of minority governments remains a wide open theoretical question for models of government formation. But models focusing on portfolio distribution predict no minority governments, as we have noted, since a minority government faces a majority opposition both willing and able to consume all portfolios. To include minority governments in our analysis is thus to include a set of cases where we know the models of portfolio distribution we are evaluating make failed predictions, and it is not at all clear what portfolio distributions these models predict in cabinets they deem out of equilibrium.
To exclude minority cabinets, however, amounts to selecting on the dependent variable for a model that jointly predicts government formation and portfolio distribution, and to include an indicator variable for minority governments on the right hand side of the relevant regressions violates our objective of ex ante prediction. Since our goal of ex ante prediction is paramount and we do not wish to select on the independent variable, we opt for the lesser of two evils and include all cases of minority coalitions in our analysis.
40
RESULTS
Estimation results are reported in Tables 1 -3 below; these include all observations except those where a single party forms the government. 41 The first parameter of interest is ν showing the 40 Results for models that exclude minority governments are available on request. In broad terms, and unsurprisingly, excluding minority governments improves overall model fit, though only by a small margin. The effects for the variables of interest -MIWs and raw seat shares -remain the same. 41 As noted, we exclude cases where one party receives a simple majority of the seats in the parliament. A much smaller subset of exclusions (75 observations) concerns observations where a single minority party relationship between the independent variables and a party being out of office (having no portfolio). The second parameter is µ, showing the relationship between the independent variables and the strictly positive proportion of portfolios allocated to a party. Taking all cases together (Table 1) , both the MIW and raw legislative seat share of a party are correlated with its inclusion in government. The v coefficients show a negative relationship between exclusion from office for both MIWs and raw seat shares; higher MIWs are more strongly connected with cabinet membership than higher raw seat shares. However, and consistent with Warwick and Druckman's findings, the µ coefficients in Table 1 show that raw seats share are far better predictors than MIWs of the share of cabinet portfolios a party receives, conditional on it being in the government at all.
Our analysis therefore yields an unambiguous substantive finding about legislative bargaining. Independent of raw legislative seat shares, parties are more likely to get into the receives all portfolios, since these do not conform to the assumptions of a zero-inflated beta model. We do however include such cases in the, substantively similar, results estimated using OLS regressions and reported in Appendix 3 of the online supplementary materials (Tables 5 and 6 ).
cabinet if they have a higher theoretical voting weight, measured using MIWs. Theoretical bargaining models do in this sense add value to predictions about cabinet membership. Once a party is in the government, however, its payoff, measured as its share of cabinet portfolios, is predicted by its raw legislative seat share and not at all by its theoretical bargaining weight. In this precise sense, the empirical robustness of Gamson's Law has again been vindicated. While raw seat shares robustly predict portfolio distribution, they do not do this because they are associated with theoretical voting weights.
Comparing Tables 2 and 3 , we see that bargaining complexity has a strong effect. In the more complex settings described in Table 3 , the v coefficients show that MIWs no longer even predict cabinet membership, which is much better predicted by raw legislative seat shares. Table   2 shows the reverse for less complex settings, bearing in mind these are the typical settings for post-war Western Europe; membership of the government is much better predicted by MIWs, controlling for raw legislative seat shares. In both types of setting, however, the µ coefficients show that it is raw legislative seat shares, and not MIWs, that predict portfolio payoffs. Tables 2 and 3 show that, while MIWs predict cabinet membership in simple bargaining settings, they are much less effective than raw seat shares at predicting cabinet membership in more complex settings.
We draw the following conclusions from these findings. First, our findings imply that the scientific community should accept and exploit the robust empirical regularity that raw seat shares and not theoretical voting weights predict the distribution of cabinet portfolios in European governments. The theoretical task is not to make this empirical result go away but to find a rigorous theoretical model of government formation that explains it. Second, and newly emerging from our joint modeling of government membership and portfolio distribution, the good news for legislative bargaining models is that theoretical voting weights, more precisely MIWs preserving types, do help to explain government membership.
We see no necessary contradiction between these findings. One way to reconcile them is to infer that the distribution of cabinet portfolios is neither the only, nor even the most important, matter that concerns party leaders bargaining over the formation of coalition cabinets. Golder's analysis of bargaining delays over government formation in western Europe shows that, in postelectoral settings, these delays range from 86 days on average in the Netherlands though 61 days in Belgium to less than three days in Norway. 42 One recent Belgian government took more than a year to form. Informal press reports of what is actually happening during these often lengthy bargaining periods suggest that the party leaders are not spending their time bargaining over the distribution of cabinet portfolios, but rather are trying to negotiate a joint policy program for government that reconciles conflicting party manifestos. This is detailed and time consuming work, and it appears from these reports that party leaders typically turn to the distribution of cabinet portfolios only after a joint policy program has been agreed. For us to go further would require setting out a model of bargaining over government formation that takes account of both portfolio distribution and the need for a joint policy program. This is clearly not our task in this paper though we are exploring it in ongoing work. Our point here, simply put, is that our twin empirical findings can be reconciled if portfolio distribution is not the only payoff that concerns party leaders when they bargain over government formation. If it were, then we would expect parties' theoretical voting weights to predict portfolio distribution, but they do not. Rather, while these voting weights have a significant bearing on who gets into government, the distribution of portfolios between the parties in government very systematically conforms to a norm of proportionality with raw legislative seat shares. 42 Golder 2010, 8 To facilitate comparison with previously published results, we now present estimates derived from OLS regressions and including all observations used in other studies -despite the fact that these models are mis-specified for the reasons we have given. The OLS estimates in Tables A   3. 1 and A3.2 are largely in accord with the zero inflated beta models presented above, but a few additional details are worth pointing out. Support for the role played by the two independent variables of interest (i.e., MIW's and raw weights) is provided by the bootstrapped estimates in Table A3 .1 which demonstrates that MIW's are in fact utilized by parties when one includes both stages of bargaining (i.e., admission to a coalition and then the subsequent division of perquisites). Table A3 .2, accordingly, shows that MIW's are far less predictive of cabinet seat allocations once one constrains the sample, as previous work has done, to only those parties that are in the government. In qualitative terms, this supports our contention that MIW's predict entry to coalitions, especially in the low complexity case of eight or fewer effective parties. But, raw weights are dominant in predicting seat shares once the coalition is established. 
